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Shahzada Rahim


Re-inventing Immanuel Kant from theology to Philosophy (Part-II)

Publié par Abbas Hashmi sur 4 Février 2020, 07:01am

Tracing Kantian philosophical traditions: "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind"

Kant, I. (1996). Religion and Rational Theology (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant) (A. Wood & G. Di Giovanni, Eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511814433
Di Giovanni, G. (1996). On the miscarriage of all philosophical trials in theodicy (1791). In I. Kant (Author) & A. Wood & G. Di Giovanni (Eds.), Religion and Rational Theology (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, pp. 19-38). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511814433.004
Di Giovanni, G. (1996). Religion within the boundaries of mere reason (1793). In I. Kant (Author) & A. Wood & G. Di Giovanni (Eds.), Religion and Rational Theology (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, pp. 39-216). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511814433.005
Wood, A. (1996). The end of all things (1794). In I. Kant (Author) & A. Wood & G. Di Giovanni (Eds.), Religion and Rational Theology (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, pp. 217-232). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511814433.006
Wood, A. (1996). General introduction. In I. Kant (Author) & A. Wood & G. Di Giovanni (Eds.), Religion and Rational Theology (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, pp. Xi-Xxiv). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511814433.002
Wood, A. (1996). What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking? (1786). In I. Kant (Author) & A. Wood & G. Di Giovanni (Eds.), Religion and Rational Theology (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, pp. 1-18). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511814433.003
Immortal Kant

Immortal Kant

Theodicy: on the critique of Judgment

By the word theodicy, we understand the defense of the highest wisdom of the highest creator against the charge, which reason brings against it, for whatever counter-purposive against it—we call it defending the God’s cause. The human being is justified, when it tests all the claims through reason or being rational before he submits himself to them. In this regard, proving God has always been the matter of controversy especially in the context of nature of things and there must be some intended effects. Likewise, he cannot dismiss the complaints with the concession of the supreme wisdom of the author of the world imposed upon the plaintiff, which would immediately explain away as groundless, and even without examination. In the latter discourse, we cannot also prove the existence of God through the experience that teaches us. In this regard, the counter-purposive in the world are of three kinds:

  1. Absolutely counter-purposive, what cannot be condoned or desired either as ends or means?
  2. The conditionally counter-purposive or what can indeed never co-exists with the wisdom of a will as end, yet can do so as means.

 Here the first is morally counter-purposive (sin); and the second is the physically counter-purposive, ill (pain). The kind of purposiveness must be thinkable in the world namely the disproportion between the crimes and penalties in the world. Basically, the proper concept of wisdom represents only a wills of property of being in the agreement with the highest good as the final ends of all things. When describing God, we often use two types of wisdom: the artistic wisdom and the moral wisdom. Through the artistic wisdom God has designed the structure of the world artistically while through moral wisdom, God designs governing rules for the world.

On the other hand, God has been as the ‘moral being’; therefore we need the speculative purposes for the natural explanation. And, this concept can be justified from the mere transcendental concept of an absolute necessary being. So in the latter context, it is clear enough the existence of such thing can be none other than moral proof.  In this regard, in order to overhaul the realm of Supreme Being, there are essentially three attributes, which drags counter-possessiveness.

  1. The holiness of Supreme Being as the law giver to counter the moral evil in the world.
  2. His goodness as the ruler of the world; he is a kind ruler who looks upon pains and ills—a ruler in comparison to bad state that relies upon impunity.
  3. Justice of the Supreme Being as Judge relies much on fairness and kindness instead of impunity.

The counter-purposiveness against the latter follows like this:

  1. Against the complaint over the holiness of divine will for the moral evil, which disfigures the world. It can be grasped in the following way:
  1. There is no absolute concept of absolute counter-purposiveness, which could be dealt with pure laws of our reason but there have been violation against it because the divine wisdom judges them according to different rules. On the contrary, none of these can be reduced to others because all three attributes contains the moral concept of God.

The subjective mind (self-love) for the foundation cannot determine the objective end (of wisdom)—even though, the general concept of wisdom, all the three attributes cannot be reduced to one another. Moreover, our practical reason might not grasp the wisdom of the Supreme Being—therefore, it can be termed ‘the ways of the high are not our ways’. In addition, the fact cannot be denied that the rational man has the least feelings for morality—this is the objective fact.

B. The second vindication talks about the actuality of moral evil in the world. In this regard, there emerges an excuse that the whole of the moral evil cannot be prevented because the world was founded upon the limitation of human nature. In the latter context, moral evil is justified, therefore, human beings could not be blamed for moral crimes instead, and we should call it ‘Moral evil’.

C. The third point asserts about the moral guilt in human beings but yet not guilt is ascribed to God because the God to lacerate moral evil just to cause the deeds of human beings; because in no way, human himself desires it, willed or promoted it. Even, it is the difficult for God to prevent the highest evil without violence. But, the fact cannot be denied that evil exists in the essence of things.

2. With respect the cause brought against the divine goodness for ills, namely the pains in the world, its vindication equally consists. Because, it is the false to assume the human fate a preponderance of ills over the enjoy meant life. But everybody prefers life over dead—so why to blame God then? Moreover,

A. Human with sound mind must be pondered over the value of life in order to pass a judgment—will he accept the sound life with the same conditions he lived his first life or with his desired conditions.

B. The preponderance of the painful feelings over the pleasant feelings cannot be separated from the nature of the specie like human being. If this is the fact of life, then why our creator brought us to life? This can be explained better in the story of Gengis Khan, who conquered India where he was never satisfying the masses nor was promising the future, one woman replied: ‘If you will not perfect us then why did you conquer us’.

C.  The third option could be this: God has created us on earth for the sake of future happiness in the heaven—Because, all the suffering, pain, is not an exception but for a superabundant blesses in the heaven. Therefore, the creature must be satisfied with every traumatic conditions of life. But still in this stage, the knot between the pain and pleasure cannot be separated.

3.  To the last charge against the justice of world’s judge. In this world, some crimes go unpunished and are grounded. It is only conscious human species, who measures his action upon the tenet of the moral law. Basically, this is his constitution and his laws that prevents from committing crime. But some commits crime through their conscience besides having mind, he suffers from the self-inflicted rebukes that pushes him towards crime at large. In the latter case, the charges go further.

A. According to Justice, there are no relations between guilt and punishment. Thus, the world needs to suffer from the indignation of life. On the other hand, the ills often resolves themselves before reason into the glorious melody not even through the notion of self-love, the dilemma of suffering can be cured. Likewise, we must morally believe in our reason to cope with the ills and to resolve our sufferings.

B. Finally, there is an attempt for the third resolution to these harmonious relations between the moral worth of human beings and the lots that befall them, by saying this:

In this world, we must pledge everything either well being or ills by the standards of human faculties based on the laws of nature”.

In the future, the different order of things will be obtained and maintained. Here everything should be worthy before the moral judgment—therefore, as a human being we can only pass the moral judgment. [1] There is no religion of the supplication but only the religion of good life Condorcet.

On the other hand, the deeds should be worthy according to the moral judgment. The moral legislation depends upon the moral self or upon the constitution of self that creates the conditions for the observance of laws. What moral judgment says; things according to the orders and laws of nature are wise and clear from every context. Likewise, according to the same reason, there is a relation between the inner grounds of the determination of will—the moral way of thinking, according to the laws of freedom, and causes of our welfare independent of our will according to the laws of nature.

Indeed, this interpretation is for the sake of theodicy, which means defending the Gods cause. Likewise, the solid grounds for defending God is still in absentia but still there is a need of major interpretations to transform the very context existence of God. Any world that comes across the genuine experiences is the production of our highest wisdom that sparks through our reason. It is because, for the arrangement of this world, we have some artistic wisdom and perhaps, this is a method to attain a psycho-theology is not wanting of an objective reality for our speculative faculty of reason.

On the contrary, there is no concept of the unity between artistic and moral wisdom, nor we can hope ever to attain it. Likewise, there is a need of higher being to bring the unity between the artistic and moral wisdom. The appearance of the sensible world produces the intelligible truth. In contrast, all the theodicy is nothing but the interpretation of nature so far as God announces his will through it.  But now, the important point here is that God’s will can either be doctrinal or authentic. If it is doctrinal then it came from external interpretation and if it is authentic then it means it came through the interpretation of nature as the will of God.  

In the latter context, as the work of God, the world can also be considered by us as the divine publication of his will’s purpose. Therefore, whatever, that claims the theodicy is doctrinal not authentic. Similarly, theodicy is nothing but the interpretation of nature beyond the faculty of reason. Moreover, it is fact that the approach of human sense experience is always relative—the moral and wise being—we call it nothing but the authentic and inauthentic theodicy. For instance, in the holy books, all the authentic interpretations have been written allegorically. Therefore, the only thing we can do as moral beings is that ‘we can make peace with our conscience’.

On the contrary, the theodicy can only be explained through the moral explanation or through moral standards. [2] Sometimes in the context of theodicy, we accept some unconditional divine decisions that have nothing to do with our mistakes then in the last, we decide that “I will do what I will”. Here the question arises: “will you defend God unjustly? Perhaps this question lingers in and around everyone. In the context of theodicy, it is not easy to grasp the wisdom of God, which is indeed impenetrable to our reason. Basically, it is the religion, which flatters the divine verdict and exaggerates the wisdom of God because there is no religion of supplication but only the religion of good life conduct.

Concluding points

Theodicy in the broader context has nothing to do with science rather only with faith. Thus, the brief look into this particular subject leads us to the sincerity not to the independent reasoning. On the contrary, faith is the central factor at the heart of the theodicy. Moreover, there is an impurity and falsehood that depends upon the principle affliction of the human nature. Today, there is an impurity in the human heart especially in those of preachers of faith and religion. There is lack of ‘formal conscientiousness’ and ‘material conscientiousness’ in the heart of the preachers. Perhaps, this all resembles the objective justice that refers to the moral stand between right and wrong.

On the other hand, today, it is very difficult to uphold the actual tenets of religion because the understanding of God has been ambiguous—the perversion of the virtuous intensions.

 

[1] There is a problem with theodicy—on the miscarriage of all the philosophical trials in theodicy. Moreover, it is a fact that even in the midst of your strongest doubts, the theodicist will say: “Till I die, I will not remove my integrity from me”.

[2] Hyper-subtle reasoning.

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